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Abstract. This article assesses the corporate governance-related antecedents of nomination
committee adoption, and the impact of nomination committees’ existence and their compo-
sition on board independence and board demographic diversity. We conducted a longitudinal
study of board composition amongst 210 Swiss public companies from January 2001 through
December 2003, a period during which the Swiss (Stock) Exchange (SWX) introduced new
corporate governance-related disclosure guidelines. We ﬁnd ﬁrms with nomination committees
are more likely to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors, but not more
likely to have a higher number of female board members. Further, the existence of nomination
committees is associated with a higher degree of nationality diversity but is not related to
board educational diversity. We also ﬁnd that nomination committee composition matters in
the nomination of independent and foreign, but not of female directors. Our results suggest
that understanding diﬀerent board roles and composition require a multi-theoretical
approach, and that agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group eﬀectiveness theory
help to explain diﬀerent aspects of board composition and eﬀectiveness. Finally, the article
discusses the concept of diversity and appropriate ways to study diversity in a boardroom
context.
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1. Introduction
Corporate governance codes typically encourage boards to establish nomi-
nation committees for the purpose of identifying and selecting new members.
Nomination committees are believed to improve the board’s eﬀectiveness
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through managing its composition, e.g. by raising directors’ qualiﬁcations
and board independence. Despite an increase in nomination committees’
existence (cf. Gay, 2001), they have been largely overlooked in the academic
literature. In the wake of accounting and executive pay scandals, research has
rather addressed the role and eﬀects of audit and remuneration committees
(Conyon and Peck, 1998; Klein, 2002), and the presence of independent
directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Dalton et al., 1998). The issue of board
composition is, however, vital to board eﬀectiveness and performance and
ultimately helps to ensure that the ‘‘right’’ persons are selected as audit and
remuneration committee members.
The essential problem of board composition is widely discussed and
studied in the governance literature, yet mostly from an agency theory per-
spective and with a primary concern on directors’ independence. From an
agency perspective, boards are the main internal mechanism to monitor and
control ﬁrm managers and it is crucial therefore that corporate directors are
independent from ﬁrm management. Yet, empirical evidence suggests that
this is not often the case (Useem, 2003; Monks and Minow, 2004). Fur-
thermore, it is often questioned to what extent corporate directors have the
necessary knowledge and expertise to perform their board roles and make
actual contributions (Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). These
lines of criticism suggest that board composition is a key contributing factor
in their eﬃcacy. A possible explanation for these observations can be found
in the behavioural view of the ﬁrm (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958;
Cyert and March, 1963). According to the behavioural view of the ﬁrm,
decision-making may be intendedly based on rational motives but is also
inﬂuenced by cognitive human limitations. According to Simon (1947) such
limitations include bounded rationality and satisﬁcing (not maximising)
behaviour. Hence, organisational decisions are limited ﬁrst, by the cognitive
limits of decision makers, such as limited knowledge of the factors relevant to
the decision or the inﬂuence of personal values, preference and previous
decisions and second, by not considering and evaluating all possible alter-
natives (satisﬁcing behaviour).
If applied in the context of boards, a behavioural theory of the ﬁrm can
help explain board composition patterns that diﬀer from agency theory
predictions. On the one hand, current corporate directors are subject to
bounded rationality, and as a result, when searching for new oﬃcers may
choose new board members who are similar to them and whose character-
istics they believe they know well. When lacking clear selection criteria and
decision procedures, board appointment decisions may be inﬂuenced to an
extent by such behavioural limitations. Nomination committees, with
established working procedures, can be seen as an important institutional
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mechanism to overcome the limitations of the board selection process. By
developing board member proﬁles and establishing selection criteria, perhaps
using the services of search ﬁrms and interviewing candidates, nomination
committees professionalise the selection process and ultimately optimise new
director selection decisions.
In this article, we examine the extent to which board composition diﬀers in
ﬁrms with and without nomination committees and how committee com-
position inﬂuences board composition. This issue is important as changes in
board composition can be expected to shape behavioural processes and
practices in and around the boardroom (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Forbes and
Milliken, 1999). There are also distinct reasons to investigate the role of
nomination committees. First, research on the link between overall board
composition and ﬁrm performance has often produced inconclusive ﬁndings
(Dalton et al., 1998). Consequently, some scholars have recommended
focusing on boardroom dynamics and board processes (Pettigrew, 1992;
Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Other scholars note that
the composition, functioning and impact of board committees demand
attention since ‘‘many of the critical processes and decisions of boards of
directors do not derive from the board-at-large, but rather in subcommittees’’
(Dalton et al., 1998, p. 284). Second, despite widespread public interest in
who is actually on companies’ boards, the eﬀects of nomination committees
on board composition and the appointment of new members has not been
established. The few existing studies on nomination committees look at
characteristics and qualiﬁcations of board committee members (Kesner,
1988; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994), or at the factors determining the intro-
duction of such committees (Vafeas, 1999; Carson, 2002). Finally, agency
theory oﬀers only a partial view (solution) to the board composition prob-
lem. We therefore rely on a multi-theoretical approach to provide a broader
view on board composition and board roles and the role that nomination
committees play in making board composition decisions.
Various researchers have pointed at the limitations of using a single theory
to explain board composition and behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989; Aguilera and
Jackson, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lynall et al., 2003). We adopt a
multi-theoretical approach examining the antecedents and eﬀects of nomi-
nation committees, drawing from agency theory, resource-dependence theory
and group eﬀectiveness theory. Here these theories are not understood pri-
marily as rival streams of thought, but provide alternative perspectives to
look at the selection and nomination of board members.
This article assesses the corporate governance-related antecedents of
nomination committee adoption and the impact of nomination committees’
existence and composition on board independence and board demographic
diversity. A longitudinal study of board composition was conducted amongst
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210 Swiss public companies from January 2001 through December 2003.
Halfway through this period, in July 2002, the Swiss Stock Exchange (SWX)
introduced new guidelines (based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle)
requiring listed companies to make boards more transparent, and to report
on the composition of committees and boards in their annual reports (SWX,
2002). This study covered the 18 months preceding and the 18 months fol-
lowing the introduction of the new guidelines, enabling us to assess the role
nomination committees play in the transformation process of corporate
boards.
The structure of this article is as follows. First, we develop our theoretical
framework and derive our hypotheses on the factors inﬂuencing the adoption
of nomination committees and the eﬀect of nomination committees on board
independence and demographic diversity. Second, we explain our sample and
the methodology of this study. We then proceed to present our main results
and ﬁnally discuss the ﬁndings, identify study limitations and suggest
implications for further research.
2. Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses Development
2.1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Governance research has been criticised for over-emphasising the control role
of boards and thus relying primarily on an agency theory lens to explain
board behaviour. Recent work encourages investigators to adopt a multi-
theoretical approach to understanding board composition, roles, and their
eﬀects on the ﬁrms they supervise (Daily et al., 2003, p. 372). In this article,
we use diﬀerent theoretical lenses to explain antecedents and consequences of
nomination committees’ existence. We draw upon agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993) to explain gover-
nance-related factors inﬂuencing the adoption of nomination committees. In
order to understand the eﬀects of nomination committees on board com-
position, we relate their purpose to existing theories of board roles. Zahra
and Pearce (1989) emphasise that board composition and roles are inter-
woven and deﬁne three main board roles: control, service and strategy. As
these three roles are theoretically and practically distinct, Hillman et al.
(2000) argue that their implications for board composition need to be studied
by using distinct theories. Based on agency theory we explain nomination
committees’ role in enabling boards to perform their control role eﬀectively.
The resource-dependence perspective (Pfeﬀer, 1972; Pfeﬀer and Salancik,
1978) regards directors as boundary spanners between ﬁrms and their envi-
ronments. Based on this view, nomination committees’ purpose is to adjust
board composition to the demands posed by a ﬁrm’s external environment.
Finally, we draw on the group eﬀectiveness and diversity literature (Milliken
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and Martins, 1996; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998) to explain how board
diversity will enhance a board’s ability to perform its strategy role success-
fully.
Agency theory is primarily concerned with the implications of the sepa-
ration of ownership and control in modern organisations (Berle and Means,
1932) and the resulting principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). The theory questions
managers’ motivation to act in the best interest of the shareholders instead of
following their own self-interest. A number of internal and external control
mechanisms may reduce the latent agency or moral hazard problem between
principal (owners) and agent (management). Agency theory asserts that a
board of directors is a vital internal control mechanism and characteristics
such as board independence vis-a`-vis management enable boards to perform
this control function eﬀectively (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Barnhart et al.,
1994). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that agency theory oﬀers a powerful, yet
rather narrow theoretical perspective. Agency theory only deals with one
aspect of board work (i.e. monitoring management) and does not address
other roles that boards may play within their corporations (Zahra and
Pearce, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Agency theory also fails to explain
motives of human behaviour, other than self-interest, that might guide
managerial decisions (Davis et al., 1997).
Resource-dependence theory (Pfeﬀer, 1972; Pfeﬀer and Salancik, 1978) is
increasingly employed by researchers in broadening the study of board roles
and behaviour (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). Resource-dependence theory
moves beyond the owner–management–board relationship and focuses on
the link between a ﬁrm and its environment. The premise of resource-
dependence theory is that ﬁrms are dependent on their external environments
which are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. According to re-
source-dependence theory, the role of boards is to act as resource providers,
or boundary spanners, between ﬁrms and their environments, to secure the
ﬁrm’s access to critical resources, to increase its legitimacy towards the
outside world and thus to reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeﬀer, 1972;
Pfeﬀer and Salancik, 1978). Resource-dependence theory extends the dis-
cussion of board roles and takes into account not just directors’ status or
independence and ability to perform their monitoring function eﬀectively but
also directors’ skills, knowledge and expertise, background characteristics
and network contacts.
While the control and service role of boards have been discussed exten-
sively in corporate governance research over the past few years, less attention
has been paid to a third role: A boards’ strategy role. The few studies linking
board composition to board eﬀectiveness in performing its strategic role base
their arguments on agency and resource dependence perspective (e.g. Zahra
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and Pearce, 1990; Rindova, 1999). In this article we argue that borrowing
from group eﬀectiveness/diversity theories may enrich our understanding of
how directors contribute to a ﬁrm’s strategy making. The social psychology
literature has established that group diversity enhances decision-making (for
a review see Milliken and Martins, 1996; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998;
Jackson et al., 2003). The underlying assumption is that variance in group
composition leads to a broader range of perspectives, skills and knowledge.
As a result, diverse groups will be on average more creative and innovative,
and thus enhance boards’ problem-solving ability. Similarly, upper echelons
theory suggest that under certain conditions top management team diversity
can be beneﬁcial for strategic decision making (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Diversity theories can aid our understanding of how board composition
patterns aﬀect board processes and ultimately board eﬀectiveness (Forbes
and Milliken, 1999).
Boards of directors thus face multiple and complex tasks, subsumed
under the controlling/monitoring, the boundary spanner/service provider,
and the strategy roles. When selecting new directors, boards need to
evaluate existing abilities and future tasks along each of these three roles.
In this article, we regard the above three theories as complimentary per-
spectives in explaining nomination committee antecedents and conse-
quences. The three theories do not violate each others’ underlying
assumptions. Instead, they rather complement each other by addressing
board roles from diﬀerent angles. Whereas agency theory focuses on the
ﬁrm owner–management dynamics and deﬁnes the board’s role in this
particular relationship, resource-dependence theory takes the perspective of
a corporate board linking a ﬁrm to its external environment and focusing
on a board’s task of establishing fruitful relationships with external par-
ties. Organisations are believed to be constrained by their environments
and resource-dependence theory explains a board’s role in managing the
complexity of a ﬁrm’s external environment. Finally, group eﬀectiveness
theory shifts the focus to the board itself and its working practices and
behaviour. Thus the three theories applied in this study allow a compre-
hensive view of board roles by considering the contexts in which board
work is embedded, namely, team context, ﬁrm context and the broader
environmental context.
2.2. DETERMINANTS OF NOMINATION COMMITTEE EXISTENCE
In the United States, the director selection process has long been subject
to criticism as powerful CEOs, rather than shareholders, often select
directors (Mace, 1971; Pfeﬀer, 1972; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Monks
and Minow, 2004; Van Ees and Postma, 2004). Although shareholders will
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ultimately elect directors to govern a corporation, they typically have the
choice of either accepting in good faith management nominated directors
or initiating a proxy challenge with very limited chance of success (Vafeas,
1999). In Europe, the latter may not even be an option (Prigge, 1998;
Hofstetter, 2001). The de facto control that management has over the
board selection process has raised questions as to the extent to which
directors can be eﬀective monitors in accordance with agency theory logic
(Jensen, 1993).
As an improved decision-making mechanism, oﬀ-board nomination
committees can help resolve the power asymmetry between corporate
boards and management by reducing managerial inﬂuence on the selection
process of new board members. The nominating committee – like other
oﬀ-board committees such as audit or compensation – is technically a
committee of the board (and thus decisions need to be ratiﬁed by the
board as a whole), rather than a separate organ reporting directly to
shareholders at the annual meeting. However, the existing distribution of
power between a board and the company CEO is likely to aﬀect the
director nomination process (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1996). Speciﬁcally, CEO duality enables CEOs to exert a
strong inﬂuence on all aspects of board work (Monks and Minow, 2004),
including the nomination process (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Thus, CEOs
who simultaneously serve as Chairmen of the Board will be less likely to
favour the adoption of a standing nomination committee which could
reduce the CEOs’ inﬂuence on the selection of potential board members
and can in the long run lead to changes in the management-board power
dynamics.
Hypothesis 1a: Firms that have CEO duality are less likely to have a nomi-
nation committee.
The board of directors is only one control device to align the interests
of management and owners in modern corporations. An agency theory
perspective suggests a number of other control mechanisms, though such
governance mechanisms are typically associated with certain costs. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) note that ownership concentration will result in higher
incentives for shareholders to monitor ﬁrm management. If a large
shareholder directly monitors ﬁrm management, the importance of other
control mechanisms such as boards of directors may diminish (Rediker
and Seth, 1995). Likewise, a large shareholder may also play an important
role in selecting new board members, limiting the involvement of the CEO
and inside directors in the director selection process. Hence, in the
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presence of a large shareholder it is less likely that boards will have a
nomination committee.
Hypothesis 1b: Firms that have higher concentration of ownership are less
likely to have a nomination committee.
2.3. BOARD ROLES AND NOMINATION COMMITTEE EFFECTS
2.3.1. Monitoring role
Agency theory suggests that the major function of a board is to monitor
ﬁrm management. The CEO has an interest in having more inside direc-
tors on the board, as inside directors work closely with him on a daily
basis and will be less likely to challenge his opinions. However, nomina-
tion committees can play a vital role in enhancing board members’
independence and reducing the inﬂuence of management (Jensen, 1993;
Firstenberg and Malkiel, 1994; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Westphal,
1998). The introduction of a nomination committee eﬀectively delegates
the director selection process to a group (instead of to a single person),
which is independent from the executive management and powerful
enough to make independent recommendations. Thus, nomination com-
mittees are more likely to heed shareholder interests by assuring that
newly selected board members will be outside directors who possess the
necessary expertise to accomplish their roles while having no employment
relationship with the ﬁrm. A higher ratio of outside directors will enable
the board to act independently from the ﬁrm’s management and to per-
form its monitoring role eﬀectively (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
Hypothesis 2a: Boards of directors that have a nomination committee will have
fewer inside board members.
Agency theory suggests that eﬀective monitoring requires not only a
majority of outside directors but also conditions to ensure that outside
directors are independent from management (Baysinger and Butler, 1985;
Barnhart et al., 1994). Kosnik (1987) found that diﬀerent types of aﬃliations
of outside directors have diﬀerent eﬀects on a board’s ability to protect
shareholders’ interests. Directors who previously served as inside directors of
the company or currently have any type of professional or personal rela-
tionship to the management may arrive at biased judgments. Hence, nomi-
nation committees are more likely to be concerned with board members’
independence, i.e. nomination committees are likely to ensure that newly
appointed outside board members have no business or personal aﬃliation to
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the company or to its inside directors (as opposed to companies without
nominating committees). Thus:
Hypothesis 2b: Boards of directors that have a nomination committee will have
a higher number of independent board members.
2.3.2. Link to a ﬁrm’s environment
As companies internationalise and face global competitive pressures, they are
likely to search for directors who will link them to the international envi-
ronment in which they operate. Selecting foreign board members is a logical
step for companies with high levels of operations and sales abroad. Foreign
directors bring knowledge and expertise about a particular market or region
and in-depth understanding of the institutions and culture from outside the
familiar institutional context (Perlmutter and Heenan, 1974). Further, for-
eign board members allow the ﬁrm and its management to gain better access
to international networks (Athanassiou and Nigh, 1999). From a resource-
dependence perspective (Pfeﬀer, 1972; Pfeﬀer and Salancik, 1978), foreign
directors are invaluable in linking the company to foreign environments
where uncertainty is particularly high. Particularly European companies, in
an increasingly international business environment and rising levels of
international sales and employment, are hiring foreign nationals at the top
levels of their organisations (Ruigrok et al., 1999; Heijltjes et al., 2003).
Having a foreigner on the board helps a company to better understand and
cope with the complexity it faces when operating abroad. Therefore, nomi-
nation committees are likely to be concerned with attracting and hiring
foreigners as corporate directors.
According to resource-dependence theory (Pfeﬀer and Salancik, 1978,
p. 193) ﬁrms are parts of larger social systems and as such need to comply
with social norms and values. Legitimacy is one of the key beneﬁts expected
from boards as environmental linkages (Hillman et al., 2002). Corporate
boards have an important role associated with the signalling of organisa-
tional intentions and purpose to the outside world (Stiles and Taylor, 2001).
Companies establish nomination committees to align board characteristics
and structure with external expectations, thus maintaining or improving the
public perception of the ﬁrm. Companies often change their board compo-
sition and governance practices in line with investor norms (Zajac and
Westphal, 1996). With the increasing internationalisation of investors and
ﬁnancial markets, there is a growing pressure to meet the expectations of
foreign shareholders by selecting foreigners as corporate directors. For
example, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) found that the appointment of an
Anglo-American director on the board of a Scandinavian company had a
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positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value. We argue that in the absence of a committee
charged with considering boardroom composition, companies may be likely
to overlook such beneﬁts. Thus, nomination committees serving the interests
of the shareholders are likely to select some foreign nationals as potential
board members.
Hypothesis 3a: Boards that have a nomination committee will have a higher
number of foreign directors.
In recent years, there has been a growing public interest in the share of
female board members. The corporate world is criticised for creating a ‘‘glass
ceiling’’, not allowing women to reach the upper echelons of their organi-
sations. However, whereas societal pressures to enhance female representa-
tion at the top are increasing, the actual number of women serving on
corporate boards has increased only marginally (Daily et al., 1999) or even
decreased (Singh et al., 2001). Prior research has pointed at a number of valid
reasons to hire more women on corporate boards. Women bring diﬀerent
values and perspectives, which can enrich the dynamics of a boardroom.
Participative boards (characterised by equal power distribution between the
CEO and the board, allowing for discussion, debate and disagreement) were
found to be associated with a higher ratio of female board members (Pearce
and Zahra, 1991). Further, having a woman on the board sends positive
signals towards the outside world. Several studies have found a relationship
between the representation of women on the board and ﬁrm value (e.g.
Carter et al., 2003). Daily and Dalton (2003) note that investors are
increasingly including female representation on boards as an investment
criterion and the absence of gender diversity on a board may result in neg-
ative publicity for the ﬁrm. Hence, women directors are an important
resource linking the ﬁrm to its external environment and nomination com-
mittees concerned with aligning board composition with the societal and
investor expectations are more likely to nominate female board members.
Hypothesis 3b: Boards that have a nomination committee are more likely to
have a higher number of female directors.
2.3.3. Strategy role
Corporate directors not only serve as individuals providing valuable
resources but also constitute a group responsible for formulating and
assessing a ﬁrm’s strategy (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Group eﬀectiveness
theories propose diversity as a crucial resource to improve decision-making
(cf. Milliken and Martins, 1996). Group diversity provides access to a larger
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information base, enabling groups to gain a better understanding of envi-
ronmental complexities, explore a higher number of diﬀerent solutions, and
ultimately produce better decisions (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Williams and
O’Reilly, 1998). Especially in the context of strategic decision-making,
diversity and range of perspectives are crucial for high quality decision-
making (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Carpenter et al., 2004). In this
study, we focus on two dimensions of diversity, namely, nationality and
educational diversity.
We previously addressed the beneﬁts associated with having a foreign
board member. While the presence of a foreigner on a board will be one
source of diversity, ultimately the diversity in nationality backgrounds will
increase a company’s ability to cope with pressures from diﬀerent cultural
and institutional environments. Directors originating from a variety of na-
tional backgrounds create a boardroom with a high degree of cultural
diversity. Despite conﬂicting evidence, some research suggests that over time,
nationality heterogeneity may have a positive inﬂuence on team performance
(Watson et al., 1993; Cox et al., 1991; McLeod and Lobel, 1996), notably also
at the top management team level (Elron, 1997; Earley and Mosakowski,
2000; Richard et al., 2004). In a longitudinal study of American companies,
board diversity in terms of ethnic background was found to be positively
associated with ﬁnancial indicators of ﬁrm performance (Erhardt et al.,
2003). Nomination committees charged with considering such issues as board
composition are thus likely to seek to achieve higher degrees of diversity in
directors’ national backgrounds.
Hypothesis 4a: Boards that have a nomination committee will have a higher
degree of nationality diversity.
A second type of board heterogeneity that can contribute to improving
board strategic decision-making is educational background. Background
diversity, as deﬁned by Williams and O’Reilly (1998), has two main
dimensions: functional and educational background diversity. The under-
lying argument for both types of diversity is that functional and educa-
tional backgrounds are associated with diversity in information and
perspectives. Individuals with dissimilar backgrounds and experiences
possess diﬀerent knowledge, skills and expertise, which when brought to a
team decision-making process, will increase its quality (Jackson, 1992).
Whereas functional diversity is a critical resource for top managers con-
cerned with the daily operations of a business, it is a less important asset
for board members. Diversity in educational background, however, may
provide a broader scope of inputs at the more abstract level of the board,
enabling its members to support inside directors in strategy formulation
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and evaluation. Therefore, we expect that the introduction of a nomina-
tion committee will lead to more diversity in educational backgrounds of
board members.
Hypothesis 4b: Boards that have a nomination committee will have a higher
degree of educational diversity.
2.4. NOMINATION COMMITTEE’S COMPOSITION AND ITS EFFECTS ON
CHANGES IN BOARD COMPOSITION
The previous hypotheses assumed that the introduction of a standing nom-
ination committee per se has an impact on the selection of new board
members. However, the composition of the nomination committee is also
likely to inﬂuence the selection of new board members. For instance, an
inside director serving on the nomination committee may be less likely to
seek to appoint a new board member who is independent from management.
Research shows that powerful CEO’s can aﬀect the composition of boards
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Golden and Zajac, 2001) and that nomi-
nation committees – like most other sorts of oﬀ-board committees – are
mostly comprised of outside directors (Kesner, 1988; Bilimoria and Piderit,
1994; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Vafeas, 1999). The eﬀects of nominating
committee composition have not been examined to date. Accordingly, in
keeping with our priors, we expect that if an independent director is a
member of the nomination committee, this will have a positive impact on the
selection of independent directors.
Hypothesis 5a: Companies with nominating committees containing indepen-
dent members will be positively related to an increase in overall board inde-
pendence.
While diversity is of potential value, it is plausible that boards will face the
same inclination as top management teams to reproduce themselves (Boone
et al., 2004). Following the similarity–attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971;
Berscheid and Walster, 1978), closely tied groups tend to select new members
who match the group culture and thus knowingly or unintentionally choose
new members who are similar to themselves. The presence of a foreigner on a
nomination committee may diminish such reproduction tendencies. This
eﬀect may be particularly notable in the selection of foreign nationals, where
uncertainty will be highest, and thus an understanding of how foreign
knowledge can be of use and may be integrated into the overall board will be
essential. There is some empirical support for this argument. Research on
group minorities has shown that a board committee member who represents
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a minority on the board will tend to favour new board members who are
similar to him/her (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Therefore, we expect that if
a nomination committee has a foreign member it is more likely to select new
board members who are also foreign nationals.
Hypothesis 5b: Companies with nominating committees containing foreign
members will be positively associated with an increase in the number of foreign
board members on the company board.
Following the similarity/attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971; Berscheid and
Walster, 1978), we expect that the presence of a female nomination com-
mittee member will increase the level of female representation on the board as
a whole.
Hypothesis 5c: Companies with nominating committees containing female
members will be positively associated with an increase in the number of females
on the main company board.
3. Methodology
3.1. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH CONTEXT
The sample of the study consists of all 269 companies that were listed on the
SWX in September 2004. We subsequently excluded (1) investment trusts, (2)
companies without websites and investor relations contacts, and (3) com-
panies with no annual reports available to the public. This procedure gen-
erated a sample consisting of 210 companies. Data on board composition for
the three years between January 2001 and December 2003 were obtained
from companies’ annual reports and websites. Ownership data were collected
from the annual editions of the Swiss Stock Guide. Additional company level
data were obtained from Thomson ONE Banker. This procedure resulted in
496 company year observations.
By law, Swiss companies need to establish one board (Verwaltungsrat),
which needs to contain a representative of the company’s executive man-
agement. However, many Swiss listed ﬁrms have adopted a two-tier board
structure, somewhat similar to the German governance system, consisting of
a management board (Gescha¨ftsleitung) comprising inside directors only, and
a supervisory board (Verwaltungsrat) consisting mainly of outside directors.
The exception tends to be the CEO, who is often a member of both boards.
However, CEO duality, where the CEO is also Chairman of the Board, is a
much less frequently occurring phenomenon among Swiss ﬁrms than e.g. in
the US (see below).
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In July 2002, SWX introduced new guidelines applicable to all listed
companies. These guidelines are similar, though somewhat less far reaching,
than codes in e.g. the UK and the US. We analysed the situation in Swit-
zerland immediately before and after the introduction of the new guidelines
(the 18 months preceding and after the 18 months following July 2002).
3.2. VARIABLES AND MEASURES
3.2.1. Board composition
Board composition is measured as those directors in place at the end of a
calendar year. In the rare case that board members were present on a board
for less than one year and were no longer directors at a year-end reporting
date, these board members would not appear in the board composition
variables for this particular year. Inside directors on board is a count variable
for the number of corporate directors who have an executive function with
the company. Directors were deﬁned as independent if they had no formal
professional or personal relationship to the company over the past three
years. Whereas previous research mostly uses a ﬁve-year period for deﬁnition
of director independence (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994),
our measure is based on the SWX guidelines that require companies to dis-
close directors’ aﬃliations to the company for the last three years only.
Drawing on prior studies (Kosnik, 1987) we deﬁned several type of directors’
aﬃliations. Directors who have served as inside directors of the ﬁrm during
the last three years were coded as former inside directors. Individuals who
were founders of the company or are members of the family of the founders
were deﬁned as having a family aﬃliation. If two directors served on the
board of directors of another Swiss listed company during a particular year,
we coded this connection as interlocking directorship aﬃliation. We only re-
corded cross-involvements in publicly listed companies in Switzerland and
excluded cross-involvements in all other types of organisations such as not
publicly listed companies, state and governmental institutions etc. Further,
we created a consulting aﬃliation category which reﬂects any type of material
business relationship between the director and the ﬁrm such as consulting or
auditing services, legal advice etc. Our other aﬃliation measure includes
cross-board involvements in publicly listed companies outside Switzerland
and any other type of material connection to the company stated in the
annual report that does not ﬁt with any of the other aﬃliation variables as
deﬁned above. For all aﬃliation categories we used dummy variables equal to
one if a director was aﬃliated to a company and zero otherwise. Director
independence was also coded as a dummy variable that is equal to one if a
director has zero values for all categories of company aﬃliations in a certain
year and to zero otherwise. Number of independent directors is a count
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variable referring to the number of independent directors sitting on a board
in a particular year. In line with the other work on board composition
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), we are
‘‘counting’’ directors and use these counts in our variable construction. This
has implications for modelling procedures as detailed below. Director edu-
cation was coded along four main categories: business, law, technical edu-
cation and others. Director gender and director nationality were recorded as
stated in the company’s annual report.
As our gender diversity measure, we used the number of female directors
serving on a company’s board. Similarly, our number of foreign directors
variable is a count variable for foreigners representation on a board
regardless of their nationality. In order to measure the degree of board
diversity (nationality diversity and educational diversity), we calculated Blau’s
(1977) index, a measure of group heterogeneity which is commonly used in
top management team and board research (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996;
Carpenter, 2002).
B ¼ 1
X
ðpiÞ2
h i
where B is the heterogeneity measure and p is the percentage of board
members in the ith group (i.e. nationality, education). The higher the value of
B, the greater is the heterogeneity on a particular variable.
3.2.2. CEO duality
Consistent with most previous research on board – CEO dynamics (Daily
and Dalton, 1994; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998),
CEO duality was deﬁned as a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of a
company also serves as Chairman of the board.
3.2.3. Oﬀ-board shareholdings
As a measure of ownership concentration, we used the percentage of equity
held by the single largest (oﬀ-board) individual or institution. This measure
was used previously by Conyon and Peck (1998).
3.2.4. Nomination committee
Firms were classiﬁed as having a nomination committee if their annual
reports stated (in keeping with the requirements of the new SWX guidelines)
that the task of a standing board committee included nominating new
directors. This classiﬁcation is less strict than that used by other researchers
(e.g. Vafeas, 1999), who only counted a nomination committee if its sole
function was to nominate new directors. Firms with a single committee in
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charge of board aﬀairs were not counted as having a nomination committee.
Nomination committee existence is deﬁned as a dummy variable equal to one
if the company reported the existence of a nomination committee and to zero
otherwise. Nomination committee size is a count variable for the number of
directors who were listed as members of the nomination committee in a
company’s annual report. Independent director on the nomination committee is
a dummy variable which is equal to one if at least one member of the
nomination committee is independent director and to zero otherwise. Simi-
larly, foreigner on the nomination committee and female director on the
nomination committee are dummy variables that equal to one if there is at
least one foreigner or female director on the nomination committee and to
zero otherwise.
3.2.5. Change variables
In order to investigate how the members of a nomination committee
inﬂuence board composition we use variables that reﬂect the change in
board characteristics. Similar to Westphal (1998), we created variables that
capture the change in board characteristics from year to year. Change in
number of independent directors was calculated as the diﬀerence in the
number of independent directors serving on the board in a particular year
compared with the year before. Similarly, change in number of female
directors reﬂects the diﬀerence in the number of women directors between
a particular and the previous year. Change in number of foreigners ac-
counts for the diﬀerence in the number of foreign directors. In our
models, the change variables are linked to a nomination committee’s
composition in the prior year in order to avoid double counting of
directors who were recently selected to both the board of directors and the
nomination committee.
3.2.6. Control variables
Boards need to be of a suﬃcient size in order to form sub-committees.
Previous research shows that larger boards are more likely to adopt board
committees (Vafeas, 1999; Carson, 2002). Furthermore, according to agency
theory larger boards are less eﬀective as there is room for free-riding
(Jensen, 1993). Board size is also considered to be an important factor in
the CEO–board relationship. Large boards were found to be less eﬀective
monitors, as they are more likely to be confronted with diﬀerence in
opinions and are therefore less diﬃcult for the CEO to dominate. Board
size is also likely to aﬀect the number of female, foreign and independent
directors sitting on a board. As we use count variables for our measures of
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board composition we control for board size (the number of directors
serving on the board) in all hypotheses on determinants and eﬀects of
nomination committees (H1–H4). We further controlled for changes in
board size (diﬀerence in the number of directors between a particular year
and the year before) in the models hypothesising changes in board com-
position (H5a–H5c).
Board and managerial ownership is an important internal corporate
governance mechanism (Jensen, 1993), which can be seen as a substitute
for forming board committees. Greater managerial ownership of the
equity will reduce the latent agency problem by making management be-
have like shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In accordance with
theory, Kesner (1987) found that directors’ stock ownership is positively
related to organisational performance. We use the percentage of shares
held by both the management and the board in order to control for board/
managerial ownership eﬀects on adoption of a nomination committee.
As this study uses a cross section of companies over time, we control
for year eﬀects. Furthermore, the introduction of the Corporate Gover-
nance guidelines by the SWX in July 2002 can be expected to have caused
changes in board structure and composition. In order to discern eﬀects
resulting from the Corporate Governance guidelines we use a set of year
dummy variables.
Since our sample consists of all companies listed on the SWX, it represents
a wide range of industries. Theory suggests that industry shapes the com-
position of boards (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996). We therefore controlled for industry eﬀects by using the ﬁrst-digit of
the primary SIC codes from Thomson One Banker.
3.3. DATA ANALYSIS
We used probit regression techniques to estimate the likelihood of certain
factors to inﬂuence the existence of a nomination committee (H1a; H1b)
which was deﬁned as a discrete variable. The maximum likelihood (probit)
estimation model was
Pr ðNC existence ¼ 1Þ ¼ Uðaþ b1boardsizeþ b2CEO duality
þ b3off-board shareholdings
þ b4board=managerial ownership
þ b5yearþ b6industryÞ
where F is the cumulative normal distribution.
To test our hypotheses about the eﬀects of nomination committees on
board composition (H2a–H4b), we used Poisson and ordinary least squares
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(OLS) regressions. Poisson regression is recommended where the dependent
measures are non-negative count variables with a limited range, as count
variables violate the assumptions of OLS regression. We used Poisson
regression to test hypotheses H2a–H3b and OLS regression to test H4a and
H4b, where the dependent variables are continuous. We modelled the eﬀects
of a nomination committee in the following way:
LðbÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
XT
t¼1
½ci  exp ðxitbÞ þ nitxitb
where c is a constant that does not aﬀect the maximisation process, nit is the
number of directors for ﬁrm i in year t, N is the number of ﬁrms and T is the
number of time periods per ﬁrm.
For our ﬁnal set of hypotheses linking the composition of a nomination
committee to changes in board diversity and independence (H5a; H5b; H5c)
we used OLS regressions based on the following model:
DBCit;t1 ¼ aþ b NCCi;t1 þ d D Xit;t1 þ Dei
where DBCi=BCit)BCi, t)1 and Dei=eit)ei, t)1, BC being the composition of
the board and NCC is the composition of the nomination committee.
Estimating the model in ﬁrst diﬀerence form sweeps out the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects from the model speciﬁcation.
4. Results
Table I contains a summary of the descriptive statistics and the correlation
coeﬃcients for all variables for the entire period of the study (2001–2003).
Forty one percent of the companies in our sample have a nomination com-
mittee. In only 22% of the observations the CEO also serves as the Chairman
of the company. The largest oﬀ-board shareholder of companies listed on
SWX holds on average 33.98% of the company shares. Swiss boards of
publicly listed companies have an average size of 7.23 members of which on
average 0.82 are inside directors, 3.71 are independent directors, 0.34 are
women and 1.56 are foreigners. The development of board composition over
time shows changes which are in compliance with the recommendation of the
Corporate Governance directive of the SWX (2002). The percentage of
companies with nomination committees has continuously risen from 35% in
2001 to 46% in 2003. Companies have also separated the positions of CEO
and Chairman during this period and decreased the average number of inside
directors serving on Swiss boards. The average number of independent
directors has increased signiﬁcantly from 0.63 in 2001 to 4.38 in 2003.
Table II reports the characteristics of nomination committees of those
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companies with them in our sample over the entire period of the study. In
terms of nomination committee composition, 78% of all companies have at
least one independent director on their committee and the committees have
become more dominated by independent directors: companies had on aver-
age 0.73 independent nomination committee members in 2001, 1.96 inde-
pendent committee members in 2002 and 2.12 independent committee
members in 2003. Thirteen percent of all companies with a nominating
committee have a female member and around half of companies with one
have at least one foreign director as a member. At the same time, the average
board size has remained stable throughout the period at around seven
members.
Table III presents the results for our tests of nomination committee
determinants and eﬀects. Column 1 reports the results from the probit
regression with nomination committee existence as a dependent variable.
Columns 2–7 show the results from the Poisson and the OLS regressions,
where nomination committee existence is a predictor of board independence
and demographic characteristics. Our hypothesis 1a suggests that CEO
duality decreases the likelihood of a company to adopt a nomination com-
mittee. There is some support (p<0.10) for the hypothesised relationship.
Further, our results supported hypothesis 1b stating that ownership con-
centration is negatively related to nomination committee existence.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b suggest that a nomination committee will enhance
board independence. Our results are in line with the hypothesised
Table II. Nomination committee characteristics
Variable 2001 2002 2003
a b c a b c a b c
Nomination committee existence 85 0.35 (0.48) 204 0.38 (0.49) 207 0.46 (0.50)
Nomination committee size 30 3.53 (1.07) 78 3.35 (1.03) 95 3.29 (1.01)
Independent directors on companies’
nomination committees
30 0.73 (1.26) 78 1.96 (1.14) 95 2.12 (1.11)
Number of companies with at least
one foreign director on company’
nomination committees
30 0.53 (0.50) 78 0.46 (0.50) 95 0.46 0.50
Number of companies with at least
one female director on company’
nomination committees
30 0.13 (0.35) 78 0.13 (0.34) 95 0.14 (0.35)
a, number of observations.
b, mean.
c, standard deviation.
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relationships. Nomination committee existence is negatively associated with
the number of inside directors (p<0.10) and positively related to the
number of independent directors serving on the board. We controlled for
corporate governance mechanisms and found that CEO duality has sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects in the expected direction. Further, the time eﬀects were
found to be signiﬁcantly related to the number of independent board
members. These ﬁndings suggest that the introduction of the Corporate
Governance directive had an immediate eﬀect on board independence.
No support was found for H3b, which suggested that nomination com-
mittees have positive eﬀects on the number of female directors. However,
board size and ownership concentration (p<0.10) were found to be associ-
ated with the number of women serving on Swiss corporate boards. Con-
sistent with H3a and H4a, the existence of a nomination committee was
found to be positively related to both the number of foreign directors serving
on the board and the degree of nationality diversity of the board. Our
hypothesis 4b suggested that a nomination committee is positively associated
with the degree of board educational diversity. The results, however, did not
support this.
Table IV reports the results from regressions linking the composition of a
nomination committee to its eﬀects on changes in board composition. Our
hypothesis 5a states that a nomination committee with at least one inde-
pendent member is more likely to be associated with a positive change (an
increase) in the board independence ratio. The results are in line with the
hypothesised relationship. The regression results also conﬁrm our hypothesis
5b which suggests that a foreign director’s presence on a nomination com-
mittee is likely to lead to an increase in the overall representation of for-
eigners on the board. However, our hypothesis that a female member of a
nomination committee will trigger a positive change in the representation of
women on the board (H5c) found no empirical support. The coeﬃcients for
our control variable change in board size are positive and signiﬁcant for all
three hypotheses.
5. Discussion
Corporate governance researchers have recently been encouraged to address
board sub-committees in order to capture critical processes and decisions
(Dalton et al., 1998). Our results suggest that it matters whether companies
have a nomination committee or not, and who are on such committees.
The central tenet of this article is that understanding diﬀerent board roles
and composition requires a multi-theoretical approach. Our ﬁndings support
the view that agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group
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eﬀectiveness theory help to explain diﬀerent aspects of board composition
and behaviour.
Our results on the control and monitoring mechanisms of boards and
nomination committees appear to be largely consistent with the agency
theory perspective. Throughout the period of our study, a steady decrease of
CEO duality and the number of inside directors was observed while there was
a remarkable increase in the number of independent directors. The fact that
in a non-Anglo-American context such as Switzerland, characterised by a
high degree of ownership concentration rather than dispersed ownership (La
Porta et al., 1999), the link between a nomination committee’s existence and
board independence is in line with agency theory, suggests that its predictions
can hold in a diﬀerent institutional context.
Further, we found some support for resource-dependence theory (Pfeﬀer
and Salancik, 1978) In our sample, boards with nomination committees had
more foreign directors as well as a higher degree of nationality diversity. In
addition, the presence of a large oﬀ-board shareholder had negative eﬀects on
both measures of board internationalisation. This result suggests that ﬁrms
with dispersed ownership are more likely to hire foreign directors, which is in
line with our argument that the internationalisation of ﬁnancial markets
urges ﬁrms to align the composition of their boards to the expectation of
international shareholders.
Counter-intuitive insights emerge from our ﬁndings about nomination
committee’s inﬂuence on board diversity. Whereas diversity would represent
a positive resource in the boardroom (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996;
Forbes and Milliken, 1999), we found that nomination committees have no
uniform eﬀect on diﬀerent types of board diversity. While on the one hand
ﬁrms with nomination committees have a higher degree of board nationality
diversity, on the other hand we found that ﬁrms with nomination committees
are not more likely to have an increase in board gender and education
diversity.
We believe that our results regarding board diversity should not be
interpreted in an isolated manner. Increasing board diversity along a number
of dimensions leads to a broader knowledge base and variety of perspectives
but also to a higher degree of complexity. At the same time, there are
institutional and economic restrictions to increasing diversity and degrees of
complexity: increasing diversity along one dimension may put additional
pressures or even go at the expense of other dimensions of diversity. In
striving for best possible board composition, nomination committees will
consider diﬀerent dimensions of diversity simultaneously. One explanation for
our ﬁndings is that if board diversity and hence complexity increases along
one dimension, nomination committees will be exposed to pressures to
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counter-balance and thus reduce complexity along less critical diversity
dimensions.
Support for this line of reasoning can be found in an emerging trend in
diversity research. A major criticism of previous diversity research is that
even though empirical studies include a number of diversity aspects, they
study their eﬀects independent from each other (Jackson et al., 2003). As
diversity is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, diversity studies should
reﬂect the interconnections between the diﬀerent dimensions of diversity.
In their recent review of upper echelons research, Carpenter et al. (2004)
point at the need to regard directors as a ‘‘bundle’’ of attributes and study
the interaction between the various dimensions of their personalities. An
understanding of the interplay between the various diversity dimensions in
a boardroom can help to better understand their combined and cumulative
eﬀects on organisational outcomes. Insights from Hillman et al. (2002)
encourage further inquiries into the simultaneous consideration of multiple
aspects of directors’ personalities and the resulting in-depth understanding
of board diversity as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. A fruitful research
direction emerges from the notion of interconnectedness among diﬀerent
dimensions of diversity in a boardroom. By reviewing and synthesising
existing board demographics research, scholars could identify the aspects
of diversity which are particularly important for boards and study on the
one hand the eﬀects of nomination committees on diversity as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon and on the other hand, the cumulative eﬀects of
the multiple diversity dimensions on board processes and performance.
Whereas creating a multi-dimensional measure and understanding of
diversity is a challenging task, it is a way to better understand the indi-
vidual contributions that directors make as well as the beneﬁts of
boardroom diversity.
A limitation of our study is that we do not scrutinise the actual process
of director selection and as a result a few important questions remain
unanswered. We do not know what the actual criteria for director selec-
tions are and what their relative importance is. We study the existence of
a board sub-committee with responsibilities for director nominations, but
we are unable to explore how the actual working practices of nomination
committees diﬀer. Yet, the eﬀects of a nomination committee will, to an
extent, be determined by the time and commitment of committee members
and by the professionalisation of the process of director selection. Has the
process of director selection changed and become more professional after
the introduction of a nomination committee or is it still the same but just
delegated to a smaller group of directors? To what degree is the CEO
involved in the nomination of new directors? In the case of a joint
remuneration and nomination committee, to what extent are committee
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members dealing with nomination issues and to what extent are they
concerned with more pressing issues such as remuneration? There is a
continuing need for a more in-depth understanding of the actual work and
behaviour of corporate directors (Huse, 2005). In future research, it will
be necessary to examine nomination committees more closely and over a
longer time horizon in order to assess the extent to which their role is
actual and relevant in a professional board.
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